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ABSTRACT
Crowds can often make better decisions than individuals or
small groups of experts by leveraging their ability to aggre-
gate diverse information. Question answering sites, such as
Stack Exchange, rely on the “wisdom of crowds” effect to
identify the best answers to questions asked by users. We
analyze data from 250 communities on the Stack Exchange
network to pinpoint factors affecting which answers are cho-
sen as the best answers. Our results suggest that, rather
than evaluate all available answers to a question, users rely
on simple cognitive heuristics to choose an answer to vote
for or accept. These cognitive heuristics are linked to an
answer’s salience, such as the order in which it is listed and
how much screen space it occupies. While askers appear to
depend more on heuristics, compared to voting users, when
choosing an answer to accept as the most helpful one, voters
use acceptance itself as a heuristic: they are more likely to
choose the answer after it is accepted than before that very
same answer was accepted. These heuristics become more
important in explaining and predicting behavior as the num-
ber of available answers increases. Our findings suggest that
crowd judgments may become less reliable as the number of
answers grow.
Keywords
question answering; Q&A; bounded rationality; cognitive
heuristics; wisdom of crowds
1. INTRODUCTION
Are crowds wiser than informed individuals? Generally
speaking, a crowd’s collective opinion—whether through votes,
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likes, or thumbs up/down—is often used to rank order items
in crowdsourcing systems, which determines how much at-
tention they receive [10], as well as users’ incentives for par-
ticipating [15]. The assumption is that collective opinions
outperform individual experts, an observation long seen in
a variety of contexts [36, 20, 7], even when they are less-
informed than the experts. Recent evidence, however, has
shown that the collective decision of the crowd is not fool-
proof. One known limitation, for example, is social influ-
ence, which biases individual judgments and degrades crowd
performance [22], obscuring the underlying quality of choices
[29]. We try to answer whether crowd wisdom limitations af-
fect a common crowdsourcing application, question answer-
ing boards.
We carry out an empirical study of Stack Exchange1, a
network of more than a hundred question answering (Q&A)
communities, where millions of people post questions on a
variety of topics, and others answer them asynchronously.
Like other Q&A sites, such as Quora and Yahoo! Answers,
Stack Exchange has a number of features for enhancing col-
laborative knowledge creation. In addition to asking and
answering questions, users can evaluate answers by (1) vot-
ing for them, and (2) askers can accept a specific answer to
their question. The votes, in aggregate, reflect the crowd’s
opinion about the quality of content, and are used by Stack
Exchange to surface the right answers. They also provide
a lasting value to the community [4], enabling future users
to identify the most helpful answers to questions without
asking the questions themselves.
We find that the number of answers users parse through
can dramatically affect how users choose answers, including
a greater reliance on heuristic-like answer attributes, poten-
tially limiting the usefulness of question answering boards.
In addition, we find behavior biases allow for users to choose
answers in an increasingly predictable way, as the number
of answers increases, running counter to our intuition that
increasing the numbers of choices makes user decisions less
predictable.
Alternatively, work also addresses some of the challenges
of data heterogeneity. Large-scale datasets of human be-
1http://stackexchange.com
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havior, such as this one, provide new opportunities to study
decision-making processes in crowdsourcing systems. In con-
trast to laboratory studies, which typically involve dozens of
subjects, behavioral data are collected from millions of peo-
ple under real-world conditions. Mining observational be-
havioral data, however, presents significant computational
and analytic challenges. Human behavior is noisy and highly
heterogeneous: aggregating data to improve the signal-to-
noise ratio may obscure underlying patterns in heteroge-
neous data and even lead to nonsensical conclusions about
human behavior [39]. We discover that splitting data by
the number of answers addresses one of the larger sources
of user heterogeity, potentially providing greater predictive
power in future models.
Our Contributions.
We use penalized regression to uncover factors associated
with users’ decisions to vote for or accept answers on all
Stack Exchange communities. To partly control for hetero-
geneity, we split data by community type (technical, non-
technical, meta) and leave out the largest community to
check the robustness of results. In all cases, behavior was
qualitatively the same and quantitatively similar. We find
that the a significant source of behavioral heterogeneity is
the number of existing answers to questions. To account for
this, we separate data according to the number of answers
questions have at the time that a user makes a decision about
which answer to vote for (or accept).
We find that a few answer attributes are important in our
regressions, including the order in which the answer appears,
its share of words compared to the other available answers
to the question, and whether it was accepted by the asker.
This appears to imply that users rely on simple heuristics to
choose an answer based on its rank, how much screen space
it occupies, or whether it was approved by others. These
heuristics may be useful proxies for answer quality, but our
work suggests otherwise. For example, voters are more likely
to choose an accepted answer after it has been accepted than
before. Although answer acceptance is often viewed as a
standard of answer quality [32, 18, 2], the only discernable
difference in an answer after acceptance is a signal that the
asker chose this answer, suggesting users view acceptance
as a useful signal about quality, but are less able to discern
that quality on their own.
We also find that heuristics better explain user behavior
as the number of available answers to a question grows. Two
different explanations are feasible. First, as the number of
answers to a question grows, users may become less willing
to thoroughly evaluate all answers, instead increasingly re-
lying on cognitive heuristics when choosing an answer. A
similar effect exists in other domains. For instance, infor-
mation overload impacts consumer’s choice of products [30]
and the spread information in online social networks [13, 27].
An alternative explanation is that later voters are different
and happen to rely more on cognitive heuristics compared
to people who vote early. This view is potentially supported
by the observation that users who answer early in a ques-
tion’s life cycle on Stack Overflow, a programming-related
community on Stack Exchange, have higher reputation than
users who answer later [4]; therefore, time acts as a potential
source of heterogeneity. In either case, the finding that vot-
ers rely more on heuristics as the number of answers grows
points to a limitation of the “wisdom of crowds” effect on
Stack Exchange: crowd’s judgments become less reliable as
proxies of quality as questions accumulate answers.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In the related work sec-
tion, we review work related to our current analysis, while,
in the materials and methods section, we discuss our data
and ways in which we analyze it. Next, in the results section,
we discuss our main findings. Finally, in the conclusion sec-
tion, we review our findings, discuss future work, and discuss
ways to improve upon question answering sites.
Related Work
Prior research on Q&A sites has shown that a variety of
attributes can provide useful insights into content quality
[2, 5, 40, 28]. For example, Kim and Oh [18] examined
how users evaluate information in Yahoo! Answers forums,
by examining the comments askers leave on answers. They
found socioemotional-, content-, and utility-related criteria
are dominant in the choice of the best answer, and found
users evaluate information based not only upon the content,
but also on cognitive and collaborative aspects. Adamic et
al. [1] conducted a large-scale network analysis of Yahoo!
Answers, trying to predict which answers would be judged
best and found that, for both technical and non-technical
sites, answer length and the number of other answers the
asker has to choose from are the most significant features to
predict the future best answer. A preference for longer an-
swers, however, diminishes with the number of answers. One
limitation in these previous studies, however, is in assuming
that the answer an asker chose was the “best” answer, and
did not correct for asker biases when choosing any answer.
Several authors [32, 18, 2] used logistic regression to de-
termine which attributes best describe high quality answers,
although, again, it is often assumed that a“high quality” an-
swer is one an asker accepts, a conclusion that our work
casts doubt on. Other works have examined the impact of
answer order on answer quality. Anderson et al. [4] found
that early answers in Stack Overflow (the Stack Exchange
community that deals with programming questions) tend to
be posted by expert users with higher reputation, and sub-
sequent answers come from lower reputation users. While
the first answer tends to be more appreciated by the asker,
the longer a question goes unanswered, the less likely that
an answer will eventually be accepted. Similarly, Rechavi
and Rafaeli [26] concluded that askers use response time as
a parameter at evaluation time. However, this hypothesis
was refuted in other works. Shah [31] analyzed the respon-
siveness in Yahoo! Answers forums, finding that more than
90% of the questions receives an answer within an hour.
However, satisfactory answers may take longer, depending
on the difficulty of the questions. Interestingly, our work,
discussed in the Results section, suggests that answer age
and chronological order are not particularly important at-
tributes for askers or voters. In part this is because high
reputations answerers do not strongly affect whether an an-
swer gets voted on (not shown). Older answers, however
will accumulate more votes and will therefore be more likely
to be voted on , but the main driver appears to by answer
attributes not directly dependent on time.
Unlike previous studies, we examine how voting may be
affected by various answer attributes. This is an an impor-
tant area to study, because people often use votes as a signal
of the best answer to a particular problem. One previous
study that also attempted to tackle this problem deduced a
set of possible factors that indicate bias in user voting be-
havior [6]. They provided a method to calibrate the votes
inside Q&A sites, principally based on the average value of
the answer and the average vote value received in the an-
swerer history. This type of calibration is useful to restrict
the effects of users who are trying to game the system, or
to signal the reputation of answerers. Our work, however,
answers a different set of questions: we want to find the role
heuristics play in answer evaluation, how voter and asker
behaviors differ, and what drives heterogeneity within voter
and asker populations. The role of heuristics in human deci-
sions has been studied by behavioral economics [16, 34], but,
to the best of our knowledge, our work is the first that inves-
tigates the potential impact of heuristics on the performance
of crowdsourcing systems.
2. DATA AND METHODS
Stack Exchange launched in 2008 with Stack Overflow, its
first Q&A community for computer programming questions.
Over time, Stack Exchange has added more communities
covering diverse topics:
• 49 Technical communities on topics, such as Program-
ming, Server Faults, Information Security, Apple, An-
droid and Ubuntu;
• 33 Culture and recreation communities, e.g., English
Language Learners, Bicycles, Videogamers Platforms,
and Anime & Manga;
• 17 Life and Arts communities on topics related to the
everyday life: e.g., Cooking, Photography, DIYers, and
Movies & TV;
• 16 Science communities, e.g., Mathematics, Statistics,
Biology, and Philosophy;
• 4 Business communities on topics, such as Bitcoin,
Project Management, and Finance;
There is a meta board for each community where users dis-
cuss the workings and policies of the community: e.g., in
Meta Stack Overflow users discuss the policies of Stack Over-
flow rather than computer programming itself. Posts that
are overly subjective, argumentative, or likely to generate
discussion rather than answers, are removed from the web-
site.
A user can post a question, which may receive multiple
answers from different people, as shown in Fig. 1. The asker
can accept an answer, which generally signifies that the asker
finds it helpful. Regardless of acceptance, others can vote an
answer up (or down) if they think that it provides helpful (or
irrelevant) information. By upvoting more helpful answers,
a community collectively curates the information for both
askers and future users interested in the same topic. The
difference between the up and down votes is the score of the
answer. Answers with higher scores are shown at the top of
the list of answers to the question, so that they are easier
to find (answers with the same score are shown in random
order). Figure 1 shows an example question with answers,
score for both answers and question, the time the answer was
submitted, answerer’s reputation, and whether the answer
was accepted by the asker.
For our study we used anonymized data consisting of all
user contributions to Stack Exchange from 2009 until Septem-
Figure 1: A screenshot of a Stack Exchange web
page, showing a question (at top) and answers listed
below in default order. The score next to the answer
(red box), is defined by upvotes minus downvotes,
and the green checkmark (blue box) denotes that the
answer was accepted by the asker. We also consider
other factors, including the times the question was
asked (green box) and the answer was provided, as
well as the answerer’s reputation (purple box).
ber 20142. The data contain information about five million
posts (questions and answers) and 23 million votes. In par-
ticular, we used the data of 250 communities, including in-
formation related to the posts: the ID of the post, creation
date, type of post (question or answer), ID of the relative
question (in case of answers), the ID of the eventually ac-
cepted answer (in case of questions), and the content of the
post; and related to the history of the votes made on each
single post: the type of vote (up, down votes, or acceptance),
the ID of the related post, and the time of assignment. In
addition, we considered the information related to the users,
such as the ID of the user, creation date (date of the sign
up), and reputation. Particularly, we calculated the reputa-
tion of the users at the moment they asked or answered a
question, considering the rules of Stack Exchange3.
Each question on these communities received almost three
answers, on average. The “Programming Puzzles & Code
Golf” community had the highest number of average an-
2https://archive.org/details/stackexchange
3http://meta.stackexchange.com/how-does-reputation-
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Figure 2: (Top row) Complementary cumulative dis-
tribution of the final number of answers posted in re-
ply to a question as of August, 2014, on (a) technical,
(b) non-technical, and (c) meta sites. Shaded areas
correspond to the standard deviation in the distribu-
tions. (Bottom row) Number of views per question
(in August, 2014) as a function of the number of
answers on (d) technical, (e) non-technical, and (f)
meta sites. Boxes indicate 50% confidence intervals,
with a red line to indicate the median view count,
and a red dot to represent the mean viewcount.
swers per question at 8, while the “Magento” site had an
average of only 1. About 10% of the questions went unan-
swered, and 42% received only one answer. Only the ques-
tions that received two or more answers were included in our
study.Figure 2 shows the complementary cumulative distri-
bution of the number of answers posted for each question on
technical, non-technical, and meta communities. We con-
sidered an average of 11k answers per community, although
this varied significantly. Technical communities had on av-
erage twice as many answers as non-technical communities,
and an order of magnitude more than meta communities,
which were not broad in appeal. Askers accepted an an-
swer 59% of the time in technical communities, and 59% in
non-technical communities, but, curiously, only 37% of the
questions in meta boards were similarly accepted. Answers
with votes consist of 86% (std 7%) of the total, but this
too varied across site types. 78% of the answers on techni-
cal sites have votes, versus 86% in non-technical and 88% in
meta communities (all differences are statistically significant
with p < 10−3 using t-tests). The median time to obtain the
first answer was 2.77 hours, and the eventually accepted an-
swer, 4.47 hours.As the community matures, the questions
become more complex, which attracts the attention of users
who may focus on different facets of the problem, posting
multiple good answers for the same question.
2.1 Logistic Regression
We use logistic regression to understand which factors
drive user actions on Stack Exchange. Because our data is
highly multi-dimensional, and some attributes are strongly
correlated with others, we use LASSO penalized regression,
where parameters are determined by maximizing the likeli-
hood function with the addition of a penalty to avoid overfit-
ting [12]. The value of this penalty was adjusted such that
the mean squared error from 10-fold cross-validation was
minimzed. As a check, we did the same fits with a different
type of penalty, ridge regression, and found the behavior to
be qualitatively the same. The fitting was performed with
the R package “glmnet” [9], which allows for fast and accu-
rate determination of regression coefficients, β.
We checked the robustness of our results by omitting data
from the largest community for each board type (meta, non-
technical, and technical), and re-determining the regression
parameters. The qualitative results were unaffected, and
quantitatively, the results were very similar. For the rest of
the paper, we focus on LASSO penalized regressions with
all boards included.
2.2 Deviance Ratio
We use deviance ratio to determine how well the model fits
the data. The deviance ratio is reminescent of R2, although
it is used for models that maximize the likelihood function
rather than minimize the mean squared error.
The deviance ratio is defined as:
Rdev = 1− Dfit
Dnull
, (1)
where
D = −2
{
log[p(y|θˆ0)]− log[p(y|θˆs)]
}
(2)
In this case, log[p(y|θˆs)] is the log-likelihood of the sat-
urated model, with one degree of freedom per observation,
while log[p(y|θˆ0)] is the log-likelihood for the fitted model.
Dfit is for the best fit model, while Dnull is the null inter-
cept model. A careful observation reveals D is simply −2×
(the log likelihood ratio), therefore the deviance ratio tells
us how much of the likelihood ratio for the null model can
be explained with a fitted model. Errors for this value are
defined in the next section.
2.3 Error
The uncertainty in β and the deviance ratio (shaded re-
gions in subsequent figures) is defined as the range of values
such that, by changing the LASSO regression bias, the mean
10-fold cross-validated error (in this case, the deviance) is
within one standard deviation of the minimum mean cross-
validated error. This spread of values is the clearest way
we are aware of to show parameter uncertainty or sensitiv-
ity, because LASSO regression, like all penalized regression
methods, does not have a standard method to caluculate
uncertainties with high dimensional data [11].
2.4 Attributes and Normalization
We use the following answer attributes in analysis:
• answerer’s reputation at the time the answer was cre-
ated,
• mean rate of reputation increase over time,
• answer’s Flesch Reading Ease [19], or readability, score,
• answerer’s tenure (i.e., time since joining the site) at
the time of the answer,
• number of hyperlinks per answer,
• binary value denoting whether the answer was eventu-
ally accepted (for voting only),
• answer score before each vote,
• default web page order for an answer (i.e., its relative
position),
• chronological order of an answer (whether it was first,
second, third, etc.),
• time since an answer was created, or its age
• number of words per answer,
• answer’s word share, that is the fraction of total words
in all answers to the question.
Answerer reputation [32], Flesch readability, and word
count [25] were used in previous works as measures of an-
swer quality, and often a “high quality” answer was at least
in part defined as the accepted answer [32, 18, 2]. To ad-
eqately compare datasets, we removed all data where the
question was not eventually accepted within the collection
timeframe. Qualitatively, voters and askers in unaccepted
questions had similar behavior to those in accepted ques-
tions, but quantitatively, we found variations on regression
coefficients, potentially suggesting voters behave differently
in this hold-out set. We also consider an answer’s rank in
the list of answers (what we refer to as web page order) and
score, because these variables affect how much attention the
answer receives [29, 21, 35]. The other attributes were also
examined as additional factors that could affect how answers
are voted or accepted. These were, however, not found to
significantly affect the results.
There is large variability in attribute values within and
across the attributes. To account for the variability, we
normalize all attributes by mapping them to their associ-
ated cumulative distribution function (CDF). CDF normal-
ization is non-parametric and accounts for the distribution
of attribute values. An advantage of this normalization is
that outliers have a minimal effect because values are evenly
spread and bounded between 0 and 1. Normalization allows
us to compare the relative importance of different attributes
by comparing their regression coefficients. For web page
order attribute, we divided by the number of answers avail-
able, which is equivalent to a CDF for the number of answers
equal to 2, 3, etc., while for all other attributes, we used the
CDF across all answers on all Stack Exchange communities.
To verify the selected attributes, we checked each attribute
to make sure correlations with other attributes were reason-
ably low, and, if they were greater than 0.7, we checked
whether removal of the attribute increased the cross-validated
error significantly. This correlation condition seems very
liberal, but we wanted to include as many attributes used
in previous literature as possible, and then use penalized
regression to appropriately reduce the effect of colinearity.
To check if this affected our results, we separately removed
wordshare, score, whether the answer was eventially ac-
cepted, and webpage order, and found results were quali-
tatively the same.
3. RESULTS
We analyze Stack Exchange data to understand what at-
tributes are strongly associated with the decision to vote for,
or accept, an answer. To do this, we find all attribute val-
ues just before an answer was voted for (or accepted), and
then estimate attribute coefficients for a logistic regression
model.
3.1 Taming Heterogeneity
Automatically uncovering homogeneous populations within
heterogeneous observational data remains an open research
challenge. In our study of Stack Exchange, we used ex-
ploratory data analysis to identify potential sources of het-
erogeneity. For example, users who are interested in tech-
nical topics (e.g., programming) may be driven by different
factors to contribute to Stack Exchange than those who are
interested in non-technical subjects (e.g., cooking), or gov-
ernance (meta boards). To account for this source of hetero-
geneity, we split the data by the type of board—technical,
non-technical and meta—and run regression analysis sepa-
rately on each dataset. We further split data by whether
the asker eventually accepted an answer in our observation
window, how an answer is chosen (vote versus accept), and
the number of answers, but find that the greatest source of
heterogeneity is the number of answers a question has at the
time the user votes for or accepts it.
In the next two sections, we discuss our findings in greater
detail, including the implications of the most important at-
tributes, and the reasons for the heterogeneity in our data.
Regression fits suggest users who vote when many answers
are visible strongly depend on a small set of heutistic-like
attributes compared to users who vote when there are few.
Furthermore, askers are found to depend on heurstics much
more than voters, which undermines the assumption that
accepted answers are probably one of the best answers [32,
18, 2]. Overall, we find evidence that the wisdom of crowds
in Stack Exchange boards could be reduced by the number
of answers to a question, and the role of the user.
3.2 Answer Attributes and Behavior
We take logistic regressions for votes cast before any an-
swer was accepted, votes after an answer was accepted, as
well as accepted answers. The average and variance of the
regression parameters across 2 − 20 answers are shown in
Figure 3. Because all attributes were normalized, the larger
the value, the more the respective parameter affects user
behavior, relative to all others in the regression.
We find that web page order and word share are the
two most important factors for users to choose an answer
(Fig. 3). Because strong correlations may affect the coef-
ficient of a particular attribute in penalized regression, we
also remove each attribute separately (not shown), and find
the cross-validated (CV) error decreases the most when the
highest-coefficient attributes are removed, thus validating
the usefulness of CDF normalization.
These findings alone are not necessarily surprising. We
know from previous research that people’s choices are bi-
ased by the rank order of items [8, 21, 35]. Word share is
potentially correlated with higher answer quality, because
relatively long answers may be more informative, or they
may just be easier to see (take up a large portion of the web
page space). We notice that both of these regression coeffi-
cients are even higher for askers than voters, across different
board types, already suggesting a surprising degree of het-
erogeneity. Other factors, however, such as an answerer’s
reputation or tenure, how thoroughly an answer is docu-
mented with hyperlinks, how easy it is to read (readability),
etc., do not seem to play a big role in users’ choices of which
answers to vote or accept.
3.3 Behavior vs Number of Answers
What is more surprising than the overall size of the re-
gression coefficients, however, is that the largest coefficients,
e.g., for web page order and word share, change substantially
as the number of available answers to a question increases
(Fig. 6 and Fig. 7). Furthermore, the models describe the
data increasingly well (Fig. 4) and reduce predictive error
(Fig. 5). In other words, users’ future decisions appear to
(a)
-2 0 2 4 6 8
Time Since Answer Created
Words Per Answer
Readability Score Per Answer
Answerer Tenure
Mean Reputation Rate
Num Links Per Answer
Reputation Per Answer
Score
Chronological Order
Answer Eventually Accepted
Word Share Per Answer
Web Page Order
Regression Coefficient 〈β〉
Tech Boards
(b)
-2 0 2 4 6 8
Regression Coefficient 〈β〉
Non-Tech Boards
Vote After
Accept
Vote Before
(c)
-2 0 2 4 6 8
Regression Coefficient 〈β〉
Meta Boards
Figure 3: Regression coefficients for answerers to accept (green circles) and voters to vote for an answer both
before (red triangles) and after (blue squares) an answer is accepted on (a) technical, (b) non-technical, and
(c) meta boards, averaged over the number of available answers from 2-20. Higher values indicate a stronger
relationship between attributes and user behavior (voting or accepting an answer). Error bars indicate the
variance of these values as the number of answers increases.
be increasingly dependent on these attributes. This is also
seen when we remove each attribute and check the resulting
CV error of the model (not shown). We find that removing
attributes, such as whether the answer was accepted or its
web page order, would increasingly impact the CV error of
voters as the number of answers grow.
A number of plausible explanations exist:
• The subsequent answers improve upon the previous
answer, or
• Some unknown confounding variable affects both the
number of answers as well as user behavior, or finally
• User behavior changes as a function of the number of
available answers.
According to the first hypothesis, the last answer may be
such an improvement on the previous ones that users will
“flock” to it. Therefore, it should be no surprise that as the
number of answers increases, changes in votes are seen. In
theory, this should be captured by a significant dependence
on answer’s chronological order: voters should prefer newer
answers to older ones. In practice, this does not seem to be
the case. The dependence on chronological order is relatively
small (Figure 3), and furthermore decreases with the number
of answers (Figure 8), which is exactly the opposite of what
should be expected if this hypothesis were true.
The second hypothesis says that the number of answers
and the behavior of the user both correlate to something else
entirely; the results presented so far could be strongly af-
fected by some confounding variable. For example, [4] finds
that the reputation of later answerers on Stack Overflow,
a technical board within Stack Exchange devoted to pro-
gramming questions, is lower than the reputation of earlier
answerers. If later voters similarly differ in reputation or
some other attribute, this could potentially explain our re-
sults. We call this the “lazy voter” hypothesis, because later
voters may simply be “lazier” and rely on heuristics to a
greater extent. It is curious, however, that voter behavior
does not seem to be significantly affected by the age of the
answer, based on our regressions, and instead on the shear
number of answers, as time progresses.
The last hypothesis is that users behave differently as
the number of answers grows. Economics and psychologists
believe that people usually do not have the time, nor in-
clination or cognitive resources, to process all available in-
formation, but instead, employ heuristics to quickly decide
what information is important. This phenomenon, known
as “bounded rationality” [16, 34], profoundly affects what
information people pay attention to and the decisions they
make [17]. Our results suggest that rather than thoroughly
evaluating all available answers to a question on Stack Ex-
change, users employ cognitive heuristics to choose the“best”
answer. These heuristics include choosing top-ranked an-
swer (Fig. 6) or one that occupies more screen space (Fig. 7).
These heuristics become more pronounced when the volume
of information (number of available answers) grows.
Instead of being a cognitive heuristic, word share could
plausibly reflect answer quality: high quality answers may
be wordy. Interestingly, however, the regression coefficient
for the number of words for each answer (rather than its
share of words) is slightly negative, suggesting users overall
prefer somewhat shorter answers if they prefer anything at
all. It is intuitive that longer answers are more salient and
catch a user’s eye, especially when there are many answers.
Whether second or third hypothesis is true, our obser-
vation of a strong dependence of votes and accepts on the
number of available answers suggests a strong limitation of
crowdsourcing answer quality: collective judgment of qual-
ity may change with the number of answers, which is es-
pecially noticable with popular, and presumably important,
questions which have many answers available (Fig. 2).
We see further evidence of the final two arguments in Fig-
ure 9, where we plot the regression coefficients for accepting
an answer as a function of number of answers for voters
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Figure 4: The deviance ratio (fraction of deviance explained by the model) for votes before acceptance (red),
answer acceptance (green), and votes after acceptance (blue), for (a) technical, (b) non-technical, and (c)
meta boards, with 2 to 20 answers. The shaded region represents the uncertainty in our values (see Section 2).
Askers have a larger deviance ratio, and therefore appear to be better modeled by our regressions, compared
to answerers. Furthermore, the deviance ratio of voters tends to increase with the number of answers,
suggesting increasing agreement with our model.
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Figure 5: Mean deviance from 10-fold cross-validation for votes before acceptance (red), answer acceptance
(green), and votes after acceptance (blue), for (a) technical, (b) non-technical, and (c) meta boards, with 2
to 20 answers. The deviance for votes before and after acceptance almost completely overlap. Askers have
a lower prediction error compared to voters, but the most significant drop in deviance for all users occurs
when the number of answers increases.
before, and after, an answer is accepted.
We find that voters are more likely to choose an answer
that is eventually accepted (the regression coefficients are
positive), but, curiously, voters are even more likely to choose
the answer after it is accepted as the number of answers in-
crease (the regression coefficient is usually even higher, and
increases with the number of answers). In other words, al-
though answer quality does not change before or after ac-
ceptance, users are more likely to vote on whatever the asker
chooses, especially as the number of answers increases. This
could either be due to “lazy voters”, who appear later on,
when the number of answers is high, or because voters are
overwhelmed by the number of answers.
Finally, askers are much better modeled by our regres-
sions compared to voters (Fig. 4) and similarly, are more
predictable (Fig. 5). To better understand what we are see-
ing, we must understand Stack Exchange’s rules. Namely,
voters need a reputation above 15 in order to vote, which be-
comes a barrier to entry: typically, users must have provided
answers or questions in the past that others upvoted in or-
der to be able to vote. Askers on the other hand require less
reputation. Presumably they rely more on heuristics than
voters, because they are less able to recognize the correct
answer. This is important because accepted answers have
been used as a gold standard of answer quality in previous
research [32, 18, 2], but, if askers strongly rely on heuris-
tics like answer rank order, this puts into question whether
accepted answers are the best standard. Instead, we find
that highly voted answers may be a better standard, be-
cause voters appear to depend less on heuristics. The corre-
lation between score and answer acceptance is surprisingly
low (0.1 − 0.2), so we have a strong incentive to explore
in the future whether the highest scoring answer is a more
effective quality standard.
4. CONCLUSION
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Figure 6: Web page order regression coefficients for voting before (red triangles) and after (blue squares)
an answer is accepted, as well as accepting an answer (green circles) for (a) technical, (b) non-technical,
and (c) meta boards, with 2 to 20 answers. The shaded region represents the uncertainty in our values (see
Section 2). Users increasingly depend on the web page order of an answer as the number of answers increases.
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Figure 7: Word share regression coefficients for voting before (red triangles) and after (blue squares) an
answer is accepted, as well as accepting an answer (green circles) for (a) technical, (b) non-technical, and
(c) meta boards, with 2 to 20 answers. The shaded region represents the uncertainty in our values (see
Section 2). Across all baords, voters appear increasingly likely to choose answers that take up a relatively
large amount of web page space as the number of answers grows.
We analyzed user activity over a five year period on 250
Q&A communities on the Stack Exchange network. The
goal of our study was to understand what factors influence
users to vote for, or accept, particular answers. Analysis
from our models of voter and asker behavior suggest that
Stack Exchange users rely on simple cognitive heuristics to
choose an answer to vote for or accept, especially as the num-
ber of answers available increases. First, model parameters
describing the dependence of behavior on answer’s web page
order and word share increase with the number of available
answers. Such dependence would not necessarily exist if web
page order and word share were merely proxies for answer
quality. Second, askers appear to rely more on heuristics
compared to voters, who need higher reputation and there-
fore may be more proficient Stack Exchange users. This sug-
gests that answer acceptance might not be the best proxy for
answer quality. Finally, voters are more likely to vote for an
answer after it is accepted than before that very same answer
is accepted as the number of available answers grow. Not
only does acceptance appear to change a user’s judgment of
answer quality, it appears to become an increasingly strong
bias with the number of answers.
The behaviors we describe are consistent with, but not
proof of, bounded rationality, in which decision-makers em-
ploy cognitive heuristics to make quick decisions instead of
evaluating all available information [33, 17]. Moreover, peo-
ple tend to use heuristics to cope with the “cognitive strain”
of information overload [37]. Psychologists and behavioral
scientists have identified a wide array of cognitive heuristics,
which introduce predictable biases into human behavior. So-
cial influence, aka “bandwagon effect”, is one such heuristic:
people pay attention to the choices of others [29]. We find,
however, that this affect is not very significant in Stack Ex-
change. Another important heuristic for online activity is
“position bias” [24]: people pay more attention to items at
the top of the list or the screen than those below [21]. Posi-
tion bias, or rank order, plays a large effect in user choices
even after accounting for item quality [14, 21], which is in
agreement with the results presented here. Alternative ex-
planations of our results, however, are plausible. For ex-
ample “lazy” (more heuristically driven) voters might arrive
later, after a question has many answers.
No matter which explanation holds, however, our work of-
fers a cautionary note to designers of crowdsourcing systems,
such as Stack Exchange: collective judgments about content
quality are not necessarily accurate.To partly address this
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Figure 8: Chronological answer order regression coefficients for voting before (red triangles) and after (blue
squares) an answer is accepted, as well as accepting an answer (green circles) for (a) technical, (b) non-
technical, and (c) meta boards, with 2 to 20 answers. The shaded region represents the uncertainty in our
values (see Section 2). For all boards, there is a decreasingly significant dependence on the order in which
answers appear. For askers and voters after acceptance, newer answers are preferred, while, for voters before
acceptance, older answers are preferred.
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Figure 9: Regression coefficients for voting on an (eventually) accepted answer before (red triangles) and
after (blue squares) that answer is accepted for (a) technical, (b) non-technical, and (c) meta boards, with 2
to 20 answers. The shaded region represents the uncertainty in our values (see Section 2). There is a large
and increasing vote dependence on the accepted answer once the asker accepts it, compared to before the
answer is accepted, meaning the signal that this answer is accepted appears to have a statistically significant
effect on voter behavior.
problem, the order in which answers are presented to users
could be randomized, or questions could be closed to voting
after some time.
Our work makes a number of methodological contribu-
tions valuable to the Data Science community. First, we
use CDF normalization to make all variables commensu-
rate. While this is a nonlinear transformation, it accounts
for the distribution of variable values in the dataset, which
reduces the influence of outliers and allows for fair compari-
son of heterogeneous variables. Also, we handled behavioral
heterogeneity by splitting by board type and number of an-
swers. To check robustness of regression results, we used
two types of penalized regression and “leave out the largest
board” analysis. These methods can be applied to model
other heterogeneous behavioral data. Finally, we measured
the uncertainty in parameter coefficients as the range of co-
efficients, due to varying the penalization in our regressions,
such that the CV error is within one standard deviation of
the minimum mean error. We are unaware of alternative
methods to accurately display the uncertainty in measure-
ments from penalized regressions, and the uncertainties from
our regressions appear reasonable.
Our analysis of observational data cannot completely con-
trol for the some of the known (and unknown) covariates
that can affect our conclusions. For example, we cannot
completely separate the effects of cognitive heuristics from
those of answer quality. A necessary step in future research
is to conduct a laboratory study to control for variation in
answer quality, similar to previous studies [14, 21], to quan-
tify the degree to which crowds are“myopic.” Despite known
limitations, our work highlights the benefits of using data
mining to understand and predict human behaviors, and
may provide insight into improving the quality and perfor-
mance of crowdsourcing systems.
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